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Soon after the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78, anti-Ottoman placards ap-
peared in important cities of the province of Syria, like Beirut and Damascus, 
between 1878 and 1881. There are four groups of placards that appeared in 
Syria during the period under study. The first instance took place in July 1878 
when two placards, one in Turkish and one in Arabic, appeared on the streets 
of Damascus. The second group appeared on the streets of Beirut in June 
1880 and John Dickson, the British acting consul, provided a copy of each of 
the two different placards in Arabic. The third group of placards were posted 
up on the streets of Beirut, Sidon and Tripoli, and Dickson provided the Brit-
ish Foreign Office with a copy of the placard that had appeared in Beirut. The 
last placard under review is a printed one, dated March 1881 and distributed 
by the foreign postal services to the European consuls serving in the Arab 
provinces. 
Since the 1930s, several attempts have been made to explain the mean-
ing of these placards and to identify the individuals who were responsible for 
them. The majority of the available studies on the subject examined the plac-
ards that appeared in 1880, while a few of them focused specifically on the 
1881 placard.
1
 However, no attempt has been made to explain the placard 
affairs within the context of the repercussions of the disastrous Russo-
Ottoman War of 1877-8 in the region. Similarly, not enough attention has 
been paid to the two significant aspects of the placard affairs, namely; the 
Ottoman response and the local reaction to the placards. Thus, this article 
aims first to contextualise the placard affairs in the aftermath of the Russo-
Ottoman War; second to shed light on the Ottoman response as well as to il-
luminate how the local dignitaries reacted to the appearance of anti-Ottoman 
placards. While introducing new information on the subject mainly based on 
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Ottoman archival documents, an effort will also be made to reassess what the 
existing literature has already claimed about the subject matter. 
 
I 
 
George Antonius was the first scholar who gave an account of some of those 
placards that appeared in 1880, in his well-known book The Arab 
Awakening. As an Arab nationalist, Antonius wrote his book in the mid-
1930s, when he was working hard to enhance the Arab cause in Palestine as 
well as in Britain and the United States. After briefly explaining the placard 
affairs, Antonius asserted that, the texts of the placards show “a specific 
programme of national aspirations”.
2
 He also claimed that a secret society 
formed in Beirut in 1875 by Faris Nimr and his close friends was responsible 
for the texts and the dis-tribution of the placards.
3
 Apparently, Antonius was 
deeply influenced by his father-in-law, Faris Nimr, during their several 
interviews in Cairo in 1935, when the latter was, at the age of 80, trying to 
recollect his activist years at the Syrian Protestant College.
4
 He had worked 
there until he was fired in 1885 because of his Darwinist views. Interestingly, 
Nimr was only able to give “an idea of their general trend and purport”, but 
nothing about the content of the placards. During the same period, Antonius 
interviewed another anonymous member of the claimed secret society, who 
also did not remember the texts of the placards.
5 
 
Zeine N. Zeine was the first historian by profession who evaluated the 
placard affairs in his book entitled The Emergence of Arab Nationalism.
6
 
Ze-ine made an important contribution to the subject by publishing the Arabic 
copies of the three placards that appeared in Beirut at different times in 1880, 
and explaining the backgrounds of some members of the so-called secret so-
ciety. He also made it clear that the placards were not serious signs of Arab 
nationalism; rather they were the works of some Christian members of the  
 
2 George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement, London: 
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3 Zeine gives 1876 as the date of its establishment, apparently relying on his interview with Faris 
Nimr. See, Zeine N. Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism With a Background Study 
of Arab-Turkish Relations in the Near East, New York: Caravan Books, 1976, 52.
  
4 For Nimr’s short biography see, Y. M Choueiri, “Nimr, Faris”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, New 
Edition (EI2), Vol. VIII., 48-49.
  
5 Antonius, 81-82. Although Nimr migrated to Egypt in 1885, Antonius erroneously gives the 
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Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism, (Beirut: Khayat’s, 1958) 
and the third edition was dated 1973. In this article, second printing of the third edition (New 
York: Caravan Books, 1976) is used. 
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Beirut Masonic Lodge who were eager to see the end of the Ottoman rule in 
the region. 
 
Zeine, too, interviewed Faris Nimr on the issue of the placards before 
he died in 1951 and interestingly, unlike what Antonius claimed, Nimr “em-
phasized that the idea of ‘nationality’ did not exist in the minds of the masses 
of the people in the Near East at that time. All the ties, relationships and loy-
alties were denominational and religious, primarily Muslim or Christian...  
National unity was impossible under the circumstances.”
7
 However, Nimr 
reiterated his claim that “their secret society was responsible for issuing a 
number of these placards and that several of them were in his handwriting.”
8
 
They were, as Nimr asserted, strongly provoked against the Ottomans by 
some members of the French Masonic Lodge of Beirut of which they also 
became members. As time progressed, they realised that without Muslim par-
ticipation, it was impossible to weaken the Ottoman rule in the region and by 
1883, the society dissolved itself.
9 
 
After the 1960s, the issue of the placards in Syria became the subject of 
several studies. Each of these studies tried to shed new light on the issue but 
since they mostly relied on the same sources, i.e., consular reports and 
recollection of some local individuals, their contribution to the subject matter 
was bound to remain limited. The first of these studies belongs to A. L. Ti-bawi, 
who made an effort to explain the placard affairs first in the 1960s, and then in 
the 1970s. In his first attempt, Tibawi’s main contribution was to pro-vide the 
English translations of the three Arabic placards that appeared in Bei-rut in 
1880, which had previously been published in Arabic by Zeine. After giving full 
translations and making a brief textual analysis of the placards, he held that they 
“had very little or no effect” and that the “Ottoman authorities did not take the 
placards very seriously.”
10
 In his first effort, Tibawi was in-decisive about the 
authors of the placards. In his own words, “the specific demands constitute what 
might be considered as the ‘national’ programme, common to Muslims and 
Christians”.
11
 In his last publication on the subject, entitled Arabic and Islamic 
Themes, however, after republishing the English translations of the three 
placards, he concluded that “the grievances voiced in 
 
 
7 Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism With a Background Study of Arab-Turkish 
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9 Ibid., 53-54. There is no evidence on the secret society of Beirut and its activities other than what Faris 
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such graceful Arabic style…can only be made by Muslims… and the Chris-
tians played only a secondary part”.
12 
 
Shimon Shamir was the first researcher who tried to explain the plac-
ard affairs in the light of Ottoman archival documents along with the British 
ones. Shamir did not make any comments on the contents of the placards; 
rather, he focused on the issue of identifying who was responsible for them. 
He seems to have been influenced by anti-Midhat delations (journals) in the 
Ottoman archives and held the view that Midhat Pasha played an important 
role in the agitation of post war years in Syria. The governor’s main aim was 
to put “pressure on the Porte to maintain him in his post on the terms that he 
had laid down.” Thus Shamir concluded that Midhat was “responsible for the 
anti -Ottoman placards which appeared in Syrian towns towards the end of his 
period of governorship.”
13 
 
Butrus Abu-Manneh was the next scholar who tried to explain the 
placards of 1880 in Beirut. In his article on Midhat Pasha, after summarizing 
the available information on the subject in the publications by Antonius, Ze-
ine and Tibawi, Abu-Manneh concluded that collaboration in political agita-
tion between Muslims and Christians did not last long because “when the sul-
tan promised better government and especially when he launched his Islamic 
policy at about the same time, many Muslims seem to have lost their zeal for 
political action against Istanbul.”
14
 In his recent article, entitled “The Prov-
ince of Syria and the Mutasarrıfiyya of Mount Lebanon (1866-1880)”, Abu-
Manneh suggested a different and novel explanation to the placards in Beirut. 
After closely examining the Reglement Organique of Mount Lebanon and 
identifying similarities between the demands in the placards and its statute, he 
argued that Lebanon’s “better administration and prosperity compared to Syr-
ia caused its neighbouring districts to wish to join it or to aspire to a similar 
status.”
15 
 
The only printed placard dated March 1881 was the subject of Lan-
dau’s article entitled “An Arab Anti-Turk Handbill, 1881”. This was the only 
placard distributed to several Arab provinces and thus was the subject of re-
ports by the local Turkish authorities,
16
 as well as by the British and French 
 
 
12 A. L. Tibawi, Arabic and Islamic Themes: Historical, Educational and Literary Studies, 
Lon-don: Luzac & Company Ltd., 1976, 120-121.
  
13 Shimon Shamir, “Midhat Pasha and the Anti-Turkish Agitation in Syria”, Middle Eastern 
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14 Butrus Abu-Manneh, “The Genesis of Midhat Pasha’s Governorship in Syria 1878-1880”, in 
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al-Sham from the 18th to the 20th Century, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1998, 266.
  
15 Butrus Abu-Manneh, “The Province of Syria and the Mutasarrıfiyya of Mount Lebanon 
(1866-1880)”, Turkish Historical Review 4 (2013), 133.
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Ottoman archives. See, Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Yıldız Esas Evrakı (YEE), 44/145. For the trans-
literation in modern Turkish see, Selçuk Günay, “II. Abdülhamid Döneminde Suriye ve
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consuls in the region. Unlike the Beirut placards of 1880, nobody claimed 
responsibility for this placard and Landau asserted that judging from internal 
evidence, “the author (or group of authors) was probably Muslim, well-versed 
in Arabic”.
17
 Landau held that while the placards of 1880 “show clear Chris-
tian influence”, the 1881 placard was the work of “Muslims –if not solely, 
then certainly for the most part”.
18 
 
II 
 
It seems that Syria was one of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire 
most affected from first, the crisis in the Balkans in the mid-1870s and then 
from the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78.
19
 Since the spring of 1876, an im-
portant number of troops in Syria were sent to Istanbul. In December 1876, a 
general conscription was ordered of all men between the ages of twenty and 
thirty. By the time Russia declared war on 24 April 1877, majority of them 
had already departed from Syria to join the Ottoman armies in the war zones. 
In addition, a general fund raising initiative was started throughout the prov-
ince in the summer of 1876 and continued in 1877. Moreover, the government 
could not pay salaries regularly during the war and at times new taxes were 
collected in order to meet the increasing cost of the war. Regarding the degree 
of hardships suffered by some local Muslim families, it is worth mentioning 
that soon after Cevdet Pasha, the newly appointed governor of Syria, arrived 
in Damascus in March 1878, he was confronted with a demonstration of 
women, mainly the families of departed Redifs, protesting against a rise in the 
price of bread.
20 
 
As for the impact of the war on the Syrian population, since many fam-ilies 
had sent their male members to the war zones, many fields were left un-planted 
which led to the reduction of production that in turn had a negative impact on food 
prices and commercial life in the province. Moreover, during the war, the Ottoman 
military defeats and Russian advances as far as Yeşilköy near the city of Istanbul 
led to unexpected political developments. Frightened by the prospect of a total 
Ottoman collapse, a group of Syrian notables held secret meetings towards the end 
of 1877 to discuss the future of Syria and the possible threat of a foreign 
occupation. After long discussions, they agreed that if the war with Russia was to 
end the Ottoman rule in Syria, they would 
 
 
Lübnan’da Arap Ayrılıkçı Hareketlerinin Başlaması ve Devletin Tedbirleri”, Tarih Araştırmaları 
Dergisi, XVII/28 (1995), 92-94. 
17 Jacob M. Landau, “An Arab Anti-Turk Handbill, 1881”, Turcica, IX/1 (1977), 218.  
18 Ibid, 220. Eliezer Tauber summarised the information in the literature on the placards in his  
The Emergence of the Arab Movements (London 1993), 16-21.  
19 For the serious difficulties that the Ottoman Empire faced during the period under study see, 
Feroze A. K. Yasamee, Ottoman Diplomacy: Abdülhamid II and the Great Powers 1878-1888, 
Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1996, 53-72.
  
20 The National Archives (TNA), Foreign Office (FO), 195/1201, Jago to Derby, no. 5, political, 
Damascus, 27 March 1878.
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work for full independence of the region. As for the spiritual ties with the 
Ottoman Caliphate, influential notables, like the Algerian Emir Abdulqadir 
(d.1883), insisted that “the Ottoman Caliph should remain the caliph of all 
(Sunni) Muslims.”
21 
 
The war had also exacerbated the existing tensions between Muslims 
and Christians. Muslim resentment was provoked by the fact that the Ottoman 
Empire had been badly defeated by a Christian power which had launched an 
aggressive war in the name of protecting the Christians of the Balkans. There 
was also the fact that the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire in general, 
and the Syrian Christians in particular, did not share the burdens of the war. 
While Muslims had to contribute to the war effort with men and money, their 
non-Muslim compatriots had enjoyed the privilege of being non -Muslim, for 
they were not subject to conscription and extra taxes that levied during the 
war.
22 
 
Finally, the arrival of several thousand Balkan and Caucasian refugees 
in Syria only added to the existing problems. The estimated number of refu-
gees in the region during the first half of 1878 was over 20,000.
23
 They first 
arrived in port cities like Beirut and Tripoli and then were taken to cities in 
the interior like Damascus, Hama and Hums. In fact, the disposal of vast 
number of refugees caused much embarrassment to the provincial authorities: 
on the one hand, some of the local inhabitants were unwilling to receive them 
in their midst, and on the other, there was the difficulty of finding them lodg-
ing, food, and transport. Moreover, to meet their expenses an additional tax 
was collected from the registered taxpayers.
24 
 
Under these conditions, the newly appointed governor Cevdet Pasha 
had to face the formidable task of rehabilitating the province administration 
and boosting the morale of the population. As far as the civil administration 
was concerned, he scored an initial success. As Jago, the British Vice-Consul 
in Damascus, reported in March 1878, "the machinery of the civil government 
had once more set in the motion and a marked change for the better in respect 
of administrative routine at least was apparent".
25
 Barely a week later, how-
ever, Cevdet Pasha was disturbed by the European press reports of a powerful 
opposition to the Ottoman administration in Syria, and of public demonstra-
tions in favour of annexation to Egypt. Both reports were denied by Cevdet 
Pasha, and by British consuls in the area. Cevdet and the British consuls ad-  
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 Zeine, op.cit., 54-55. 
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FO, 195/1201, Jago to Derby, no. 5, political, Damascus, 27 March 1878.  
23 Tufan Buzpınar, Hilafet ve Saltanat: II. Abdülhamid Döneminde Halifelik ve Araplar, Istan-
bul: Alfa yayınları, 2016, 263.
  
24 Tufan Buzpinar, “The Repercussions of the Russian-Ottoman War of 1877-1878 on the Otto-man 
Arab Provinces”, in Ömer Turan (ed.), The Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878, Ankara: Middle 
East Technical University, 2007, 231-232.
  
25 TNA, FO, 195/1201, Jago to Derby No. 5, Political, Damascus, 27 March 1878; FO, 78/2850, 
Jago to Layard, no. 10, Damascus, 28 April 1878.
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mitted the existence of discontent and complaints against the Ottoman gov-
ernment, especially among those who had sent relatives to the battlefield, but 
emphasized that the degree of discontent and disaffection reported was no-
where near to rebellion or uprising.
26 
 
III 
 
The degree of discontent and disaffection against the government, however, 
was still enough to cause some anxiety in Damascus. It manifested itself in 
the form of two placards, one in Arabic and one in Turkish, copies of which 
were posted up in July 1878 in a number of places in Damascus. The identity 
of the authors is unclear, though Nasif Meshaka,
27
 the dragoman of the Brit-
ish consulate in Beirut, who had seen the originals and translated them into 
French, was of the opinion that a certain Abdallah Ldilbi [sic] knew the au-
thors but declined to reveal their names.
28
 According to Nasif, everything 
happened in such a short time that not many people became aware of the 
placards. Consequently, there was a good deal of talk, but no effect worthy of 
notice was produced.
29 
 
As for their contents, the Turkish placard was almost entirely devoted 
to Cevdet Pasha's alleged misdoings; he was mainly accused of taking bribes. 
This may also explain the reason why it was written in Turkish. There was no 
evidence of any revolutionary ideology, but strikingly, it complained about 
the tithe and asserted that the rebellion of the Bulgarians, Montenegrins and 
Serbs had been caused by the question of the tithe. In other words, the au-
thor/s warned the governor that under the post war conditions of Syria, tax 
collection was a delicate issue that could create serious problems. The placard 
concluded with the following warning to Cevdet Pasha: 
 
 
 
 
26
For Cevdet's statement on this issue see, BOA, YEE, 35/67. For the British consul general’s 
report see, TNA, FO, 195/1201, Eldridge to Derby, Beirut, 26 March 1878. Immediately after he 
returned from Syria to Istanbul in October 1879, Layard, the British Ambassador, reported to 
Lord Salisbury, the Foreign Secretary, that while in the region he “did not hear anything about 
annexation to Egypt”. Sinan Kuneralp, The Private Letters of Sir Austen Henry Layard 
During His Constantinople Embassy 1877-1880 , Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2018, 643.  
27 Nasif was son of Mikhail Meshaka (1800-1888), diplomat and historian who served as the first 
vice –consul of the United States of America in Damascus between 1859 and 1870. Meshaka family 
served for the American and British diplomatic missions in the region until the WWI and were under 
British protection. Nasif himself served for the British consulate in Beirut as a dra-goman since the 
1860s. For the diplomatic role of the Meshaka family in Syria and the Lebanon see, E. Keskinkılıç 
and E. Ceylan, “Her Majesty’s Protected Subjects: The Mishaqa Family in Ottoman Damascus”, 
Middle Eastern Studies, (2015) 51/2, 175-194; Eugene L. Rogan, “Sectari-anism and Social 
Conflict in Damascus: The 1860 Events Reconsidered”, Arabica, LI/4 (2004), 493-511.
  
28 TNA, FO, 226/194, Nasif Meshaka to Eldridge, two private letters, Damascus, 26, and 29 July 
1878.
  
29 Ibid. 
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“We keep daily accounts of all your business and your deeds. That is enough 
for the moment to make you reflect. 
 
Behave as is necessary in the high mission in thanking divine providence for 
having accorded to you this gift which you do not deserve. Otherwise if you 
act contrary to the will of God and of the prophet we are ready to post up, in 
the streets of the town, all your affairs and to expose them.”
30 
 
The Arabic placard was much more important in content. Although the 
starting point was the same, namely, the oppression of the local officials, it 
bore an openly revolutionary character, and its author/s were evidently edu-
cated and acquainted with Western ideas of a liberal and secular stamp. Nasif 
Meshaka saw a copy of the Arabic placard, which was “written by Abdallah 
Ldilbi [sic] in his usual bad hand writing”. Nasif stated that Abdallah “seemed 
to know the authors but I could not get their names”.
31
 The authors implied 
that they were not Syrians but presented themselves as friends of Syria and 
added that there were other friends who would help the Syrians in reforming 
faults. It addressed the Syrians in general, both Muslims and Christians, and 
called upon them to separate religion from politics. The following is an ex-
tended summary of the translation made for the British consulate in Beirut: 
 
The principal cause of the consolidation of the basis of peoples is the correc-
tion of the faults of the governors and the amelioration of the administration. It 
is necessary that the subjects make efforts to reach this goal by following the 
path of diligence and liberty and by pushing aside every personal interest and 
every discord. 
 
Syria! Raise yourself without delay from negligence. Put yourself to work. [...] 
It is enough that you suffer from the oppression and misfortune, from abase-
ment and opprobrium. [...] The hand of the governors and of the administrators 
raise upon you. The bureaus are corrupt and the tribunals oppressed. There is 
no respect for your virtuous ones, no estimation for your man of learning [...] 
they have removed from you the most precious gift of union and concord. Do 
you not know that religion does not enter into politics? 
 
Syria! The greatest enemy of your progress is he who sows discord among 
your population, Christians, Muslims and others... Follow the path of liberty 
with persistence and concord. 
 
 
30 TNA, FO, 226/194, Meshaka to Eldridge, private letter, 26 July 1878. One Turkish and one 
Arabic placard were seen and translated by Meshaka, the dragoman of the British consulate. However 
originals of the placards were not sent to Eldridge. Meshaka does not explain why he did not provide 
the British consulate with a copy of the original placard. For the French transla-tion of the Turkish 
placard see, TNA, FO, 226/194 Meshaka to Eldridge, 26 July 1878; and of the Arabic one see FO 
226/194 Meshaka to Eldridge, 29 July 1878. Eldridge summed up the contents of the placards and 
sent to Salisbury and Layard: TNA, FO, 424/73, No. 305, Eldridge to Salis-bury no. 62 Political, 
Aleih, 2 August 1878; Eldridge to Layard No. 74, 2 August 1878.
  
31 TNA, FO, 226/194 Meshaka to Eldridge, private letter, 29 July 1878. Bad handwriting might be 
the reason why Meshaka did not send Eldridge an original copy of the placard.
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Do not believe Syria that you are alone in reforming faults. We have other 
friends who will aid you and who await you.
32
 Awake yourself from your 
sleep... Personal interests must be put aside when the prosperity and progress 
of your country are in question. Beware not to empty your pen and tongue, be-
cause the reigns of the government are going to pass to you. All this is myste-
rious. But it is for you who are intelligent to understand that the duty of a 
friend is to commence. It is for you to achieve. In any case, I will return to you 
in one of these days.
33 
 
None of the figures involved in providing Eldridge with these transla-
tions of the placards commented on them, and Eldridge's only comment was as 
follows: “I do not pretend to understand the meaning, if they have any, of these 
allusions to external aid. The whole spirit of this placard is one inviting the 
inhabitants to resist the oppression of Djevdet Pasha...though there are no signs 
of dissatisfaction against the Ottoman rule.”
34
 Interestingly, in a detailed report 
addressed to the Porte about the regional affairs, like Eldridge, Cevdet Pasha 
also underlined the existence of local dissatisfaction, but he held that it was 
against the local officials’ abuse, not against the Ottoman government.
35 
 
The 1878 placards were the first of their kind in Syria in the aftermath 
of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78. The principle target of both placards 
was local officials headed by the governor general. The Arabic placard con-
sistently complained about oppression, corruption, and negligence. It then 
asked the people of Syria to put aside personal interests and discord and ad-
vised them that they could improve their position only by union and concord. 
It underlined that being identified as Christians and Muslims was a serious 
discord that served the interests of the rulers. Therefore, it asked the Syrians 
to put religious identities aside and unite on the concept of homeland, Syria. 
In other words, the authors were aware of the existence of strong religious 
identities among the population of the region and wished to weaken it by a 
united action against the local government. British diplomatic reports from 
the region support the view that religious identities were strong enough to 
lead to clashes between Christians and Muslims in those years.
36
 Finally, the 
absence of any reference to Arabs or Arabism in both placards is also worth 
noting. 
 
 
32 Underlined in the original.  
33 According to Abdallah Ldilbi, the only source, copies of the Arabic placard were posted up in the 
following places in Damascus: Seraglio, Umayyad Mosque, Malek al-Zahir (near the Umay-yad 
mosque), Bab al-Barid and Akkaybeh [sic]. Ldilbi also mentioned that the copy, which was posted up 
in the Umayyad mosque, was taken to Cevdet Pasha by sheikh Salem al-Attar. TNA, FO, 226/194, 
Meshaka to Eldridge, private letter, 29 July 1878. Salem al-Attar (1817-1889) was one of the leading 
scholars of Damascus. For a short biographical information see, Muhammad Muti‘ al-Hafiz, Nizar 
Abaza, Tarikh Ulema Dimashq, Dimashq: Dar al-Fikr, 1986, 89-92.
  
34 TNA, FO, 424/73, No. 305, Eldridge to Salisbury, No. 62, Political, Aleih, 2 August 1878.  
35 BOA, YEE, 35/67, Cevdet Pasha to the Porte, n.d.  
36 TNA, FO, 424/73 and FO 78/2848, Eldridge to Layard no. 76, Aleih, 3 August 1878. 
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News of disturbing developments in Syria soon reached Istanbul and 
was followed by a direct approach to the Porte by the British ambassador 
Layard, warning that serious accusations against Cevdet Pasha's gross corrup-
tion had reached him.
37
 Meanwhile the Porte decided to send two officials, 
Halil Eyüp Efendi and Rıza Efendi, to Syria to carry out investigations into 
the affairs of the province and into a possible plot or revolutionary activity in 
the region.
38
 The investigators stayed in Damascus for some time and spoke 
to several notables (meşayih, Urban) of the city. Rıza Efendi, in particular, 
carried out investigations in the Christian quarters of Damascus.
39
 Cevdet 
held that Halil Eyüp’s “aim was to make the Porte believe that a rebellion in 
the Mount [Lebanon] was imminent and that could spread all over Syria”. 
Since Cevdet’s own investigations did not support this view, the investigators 
received little assistance from him who argued that: 
 
If there is something in the province to be investigated, or any information is 
needed about a particular case, the provincial officials should have been con-
sulted [in the first place], for it is the province officials who know the true na-
ture of local events and political developments.
40 
 
The reports of the two investigators have not been traced. Therefore, it re-mains 
unclear to what degree Cevdet Pasha was guilty of the charges of cor-ruption 
levelled against him. However, Rousseau, the French Consul in Da-mascus, had 
cast doubt on accusations against Cevdet Pasha. In a report on this issue dated 30 
July 1878, Rousseau “claimed to know from personal ex-perience that several 
Greek Orthodox members of the Vali's personal staff were corrupt and made it 
appear as if he would settle no business without pe-cuniary assistance".
41
 
Eldridge, on his part, warned his superiors that he could not undertake to prove 
the charges against Cevdet Pasha.
42
 Equally unclear is the reaction of the 
authorities in Istanbul. The fact that Cevdet Pasha was or-dered in September 
1878 to resolve a communal conflict in Kozan, a town in the province of 
Adana,
43
 suggests that the Porte was not too disturbed: it 
 
 
37 Tercüman-ı Hakikat, No. 43, 15 August 1878; TNA, FO, 78/4275, White to Salisbury, no. 
216, Secret, Constantinople, 21 May 1890, enclosing a copy of Layard's despatch to Salisbury, 
no. 1072, Constantinople, 27 August 1878; TNA, FO, 78/2771, Salisbury to Layard, no. 1096, 
TNA, FO, 14 September 1878.
 
38 Both men were originally from Syria but at the time were employed at the Porte. Halil Eyüp 
Efendi was a junior interpreter at the Porte whereas Riza Efendi worked for the Ministry of Po-lice. 
See, BOA, YEE, 35/67, Cevdet Pasha to the Porte, n.d.
 
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid.  
41 Max L. Gross, Ottoman Rule in the Province of Damascus, 1860-1909, Unpublished PhD thesis, 
Georgetown University 1979, Vol. I, 253, fn.116.
 
42 TNA, FO, 424/73, Eldridge to Salisbury, no. 62, political, Aleih, 2 August 1878.  
43 TNA, FO, 78/2848, Eldridge to Salisbury, no. 78, Political, Aleih, 15 September 1878; Ibid,? Eldridge 
to Layard No. 113, Beirut, 10 November 1878.
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would scarcely have permitted the Vali to leave Damascus, if it believed ma-
jor trouble was imminent. 
 
Be that as it may, the Porte recalled Cevdet Pasha from Syria in No-
vember 1878, shortly after his return from Kozan. The documents governing 
the appointment of his successor Midhat Pasha make it plain that the Porte 
held the view that Syria deserved a better administration and increased pros-
perity; hence, Midhat was chosen as a strong ruler who would achieve the 
stated goal.
44
 At the same time, the fact that Cevdet was soon promoted to 
the post of the Minister of Trade and Agriculture
45
 does not permit us to 
draw the conclusion that the central government was dissatisfied with 
Cevdet's perfor-mance in Syria. 
 
 
IV 
 
During the first year of his governorship in Syria, Midhat Pasha achieved im-
portant successes in the areas of security, justice department and administra-tive 
structure; he established two new sub-governorships (central Damascus (merkez 
mutasarrıflık and Jabal Nusayr), restructured the police department, and 
increased the number of courts. He also made new arrangements geared toward 
reducing the cost of annual hajj caravan (surre). However, from the last quarter of 
1879 onward, and especially after the Porte’s decision to make the courts 
independent of the provincial governors, Midhat’s relations with the Porte 
deteriorated. He argued that in order to increase the degree of securi-ty and stability 
in Syria, it was important that the courts would be subject to the governor as the 
highest authority in the province. Interestingly, it was dur-ing the period of strained 
relations between the governor and the Porte that anti -Ottoman placards appeared 
on the streets of Beirut and Damascus. 
 
Anti-Ottoman placards appeared three times in the second half of June 
1880 on the streets of Beirut. Although no evidence remained from the first 
group, Dickson, the British acting consul, obtained a copy of each of the se-
cond and the third group of handwritten placards. Each placard has a sketch of 
a drawn sword followed by a short text.
46
 In the first placard, after referring 
to Moses, Socrates, Jesus and Muhammad respectively in chronological order 
as distinguished reformers, the authors presented themselves as people, who 
cared about the welfare and honour of the Syrians. The Turks, as rulers of the 
country, were presented as careless and degraded and did not uphold the hon-
our of the local people. The main emphasis was on the Syrians irrespective of  
 
44 BOA, Irade Dahiliye, 63122, 15 Zilkaade 1295 (10 November 1878).  
45 Ebul’ula Mardin, Medeni Hukuk Cephesinden Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, 1822-1895, reprint, Anka-ra: 
Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayını, 1996, 145-146.
 
46 For the reproduction of the original placards obtained by Dickson see, Zeine, op. cit, 152-153; for 
English translations see TNA, FO, 195/1306, enclosures in Dickson to Goschen, no. 47, Bei-rut 3 July 
1880; Tibawi, Arabic & Islamic, op. cit., 117-118.
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religious denominations and only in the concluding part, there was a single 
reference to Arab pride. The second placard appeared a few days later and 
was written with a different handwriting, as a kind of continuation of the for-
mer. It was devoted to the criticism of Turkish rule and argued that any hope 
of the reform of the “Turks is impossible”. That is why it asked compatriots to 
assume responsibility to rule the country.
47 
 
The two placards contain some interesting features. First, both placards 
put a clear emphasis on Syria without using the term “fatherland” (watan)
48
, 
addressed their audience as “O sons of Syria”, a new concept that started to 
develop especially since the 1850s and adopted by Christian intellectuals like 
Butrus al-Bustani (1819-1883) and Khalil al-Khuri (1836-1907).
49
 Although 
Syria was used for the first time in 1865 as an official name for the newly 
created province comprised of cities like Damascus, Beirut, Tripoli and even 
al-Quds, it is not clear whether it was used in the provincial context or wid-
er/narrower than that.
50
 Recent studies suggest that other than as an official 
name for the province, by the 1880s a limited number of Christian intellectu-
als referred to the religiously and politically diversified Syrian region as their 
watan. However, its exact meaning was still ambiguous in the period under 
study: what it meant to be a Syrian, which areas were parts of the Syrian terri-
tory and how it was going to co-exist with existing deep-rooted identities es-
pecially the religious ones. The religiously heterogeneous people of the region 
could not produce a common answer to these questions.
51
 Considering the 
possibility of Christian and Muslim joint action against the Turks, John 
Abcarious, the dragoman of the British consulate in Beirut, stated a week after 
the appearance of the second placard that “no earthly power can bring these 
two elements into union”. He also stated, “patriotism is a word without mean-  
 
47 A loose translation of this placard into Turkish is in the Yıldız Palace archives. It has no date, no 
comment and no signs that might help to evaluate it. BOA, YEE, 147/27.
  
48 The term watan (fatherland) is used three times in the second placard. Traditionally the Arabic 
term watan meant one’s own district, city or village and its environs.
  
49 For Bustani and Khuri’s role in introducing new concept of watan see Adel Beshara (ed), The 
Origins of the Syrian Nationhood: Histories, Pioneers and Identity, Oxon: Routledge, 2011, 57-
78; 91-107.
  
50 For a significant account of how the name “Syria” came into use in official and unofficial circles 
see, Butrus Abu-Manneh, “The Establishment and Dismantling of the Province of Syria, 1865-1888”, 
in John Spagnolo (ed), Problems of the Modern Middle East in Historical Perspec-tive: Essays 
in Honour of Albert Hourani, Reading: Ithaca Press, 1992, 7-26. In December 1887, a few years 
after the placard affairs, Beirut was separated from the province of Syria and became the centre of a 
new province comprised of Latakiya, Tripoli, Acre and Nablus. Ibid, 24.
  
51 See articles by Lamia Rustum Shehadeh, “The Name of Syria in Ancient and Modern Usage”, 
Arnon Groiss, “Communalism as a factor in the rise of the Syrian idea in the 1800s and the early 
1900s”; and Fruma Zachs, “Pioneers of Syrian patriotism and identity: A re-evaluation of Khalil al-
Khuri’s contribution” in Adel Beshara (ed), The Origins of the Syrian Nationhood, 17-29; 30-54; 
91-107, respectively.
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ing to the Orientals generally”.
52
 Second, while both placards displayed an 
openly anti-Turkish attitude, the emphasis on the Arabs was unexpectedly 
weak. The term Arab was used only once in the first placard and it did not 
appear in the second at all. Finally, both placards contained strong invitations 
to revolt against the Turks and to take the control of the country, i.e., Syria, in 
their hands.  
As for the immediate impact of the placards on the people of Beirut, it 
appears from the British diplomatic correspondences that not many people 
became aware of their contents. No doubt was the appearance of such anti-
Turkish placards unexpected and Dickson stated that “this incident is one so 
unusual for such a quiet town as Beyrout”. Although they caused a feeling of 
curiosity among some circles as to the people behind them, “very little effect 
has been produced on the minds of the people of Beyrout”. Dickson himself 
thought that it might be taken as an indication of a united voice of Muslim 
and Christian “against Turkish misrule”.
53
 His dragoman John Abcarious, 
however, had a different view. Under instruction, Abcarious prepared a report 
on the placard issue and it began by stating that “it is difficult, not to say im-
possible, to believe that the outcry, as set forth in the placards, is one of a 
joint contribution between Muslims and Christians throughout Syria”.
54 
 
Abcarious, being a native educated Christian, spent almost a week on 
the issue of placards and tried to find out who organized them. He examined 
the alternatives one by one; firstly, he addressed the possibility of Muslim 
Christian joint action against the Turks. He then categorically eliminated the 
possibility of such an action and argued that each community had its own 
goal, “one may be struggling to overthrow the Turks and establish an Arab 
Caliphate, while the other may be working for a Christian Kingdom”
55
. Sec-
ondly, the possibility of a purely Muslim initiative was out of question, be-
cause Muslims would not choose a city like Beirut where they were not in 
majority and, also as a port city, Beirut was “within the reach of naval force”, 
thus inconvenient for any resurgent action. Moreover, “the Muslims have now 
been under Ottoman power for several centuries, giving due respects to their 
rulers and devoted to them by religious ties never showing any spirit of revolt, 
so it would be hardly fair to attribute the agitation to them”. Thirdly, the 
Christians could not be behind this event for they were divided in “so many 
different denominations that no probability of joint cooperation is at all like-
ly”. The only design they could have was “to give the country to a foreign 
 
 
52 Dickson instructed John Abcarious to make inquiries confidentially concerning the subject. 
For the memorandum submitted on 3 July 1880 by Abcarious to the Beirut consulate see, TNA, 
FO, 195/1306, enclosure in Dickson to Goschen, no. 47, Beirut 3 July 1880.
  
53 TNA, FO, 195/1306, Dickson to Goschen, no. 47, Beirut, 3 July 1880.  
54 Enclosure in Ibid.  
55 Faris Nimr, allegedly a member of the Beirut secret society of the 1870s, underlined during his 
interview with Zeine that “all ties, relationships and loyalties were denominational and religious, 
primarily Muslim or Christian. The Muslim was principally either Sunni or Shi’i and the Chris-tian 
was chiefly either Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Catholic, or Protestant”. Zeine, op. cit., 52.
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power but in this they will also disagree for the Roman Catholics would be 
fighting for France and Greek Orthodox for Russia while the few Protestants 
will be longing for England”. 
 
Abcarious concluded that the motives “must be sought elsewhere”. To 
him, it had to be attributed either to the “personal interests of one or two Bey-
rout Moslems who have been turned out from office or who being wealthy 
and of standing think themselves better qualified than the Turks to get into 
power, or to the personal interests of Midhat Pasha…with the view of either 
intimidating the Porte and obtaining the unlimited power he has been seeking 
to procure” or to show the European powers especially to England that “a 
spirit of revolt has sprung up in Syria… and thereby induce them to take up 
his cause”. He was inclined to think that Midhat Pasha was likely to be behind 
the outcry because of the following reasons: Firstly, “the placards were hung 
up in a city where no danger is supposed to issue from the excitement”. Sec-
ondly, the governor of Beirut was a “confidential friend of Midhat Pasha”
56
. 
Thirdly, no effort was made by the Turkish authorities in Beirut to find out 
the agitators. Finally, from the time Midhat Pasha arrived in Syria, editors of 
local newspapers were allowed to speak “freely on the future prospects of 
Turkey, on the mismanagement of the Turks in general”.
57 
 
Dickson did not share his dragoman’s conclusion that Midhat Pasha 
could be responsible for the placards. However, he admitted that many Mus-
lims and Christians of Beirut were of the view that the governor general could 
be behind the agitation and Abcarious could have been influenced by it. He 
believed that it was “scarcely probably that His Highness is the prime mover 
in a revolutionary project. Since it would be too dangerous an expedient for 
him to venture upon considering the desire he had at present of consolidating 
the Sultan, with a view if possible, of obtaining a place in the ministry”. 
However, Dickson gave credit to the view that Midhat Pasha on purpose dis-
played “a certain amount of indifference as showing the disorganised state of 
the province and the necessity of acceding to his often repeated for full pow-
ers in order to introduce reforms”. He attributed the responsibility of the plac-
ards to a secret society, which existed in Syria since 1875 and had the aim to 
obtain “a sort of administrative autonomy for the province, the Sultan being 
acknowledged as nominal sovereign”, if this was not possible, “to make a 
strike for entire independence. These placards may have emanated from this 
society”.
58
 Dickson’s view was supported by Faris Nimr, a member of that 
secret society. Faris Nimr told Zeine, the first historian of the subject, that 
 
 
56 At the time the governor, Mehmed Raif, was in Istanbul.  
57 TNA, FO, 195/1306, report by Abcarious in, Dickson to Goschen, no. 47, Beirut 3 July 1880. For 
almost identical views on this issue expressed by Layard in October 1879 see Kuneralp,
  
Private Letters of Sir Austen Henry Layard, op.cit., 640.  
58 TNA, FO, 195/1306, Dickson to Goschen, no. 47, Beirut, 3 July 1880. 
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“their secret society was responsible for issuing a number of these placards 
and that several of them were in his handwriting”.
59 
 
While speculation about the Beirut placards was still around, Jago, the 
British vice consul in Damascus, reported that the revolutionary placards had 
been posted up on the streets of Damascus, one even being stamped on his door. 
Unfortunately, he did not preserve a copy of the placards, but described it in the 
following few words: “It is written evidently by one of the Ulema class, part of it 
being couched in Qur’anic language, is addressed to the peo-ple as if by an 
outsider, and exhorts them to rise and shake of the rule of those who left the 
precepts of the Qur’an”. As for its impact, Jago stated, “little or no notice has 
been taken of these appeals, there being, as far as I can judge, no party or 
individuals in Syria to take the initiative in any overt act against the government 
by reason of the absence of leaders”.
60
 According to Jago, the main reason why 
there was no serious opposition to the government was that the Muslim notables 
of Damascus were integrated into the Ottoman adminis-trative system and 
formed “the official entourage of the government”.
61 
 
Although the placards did not have a serious impact on the local popu-
lation in Beirut or Damascus, their impact on the Porte was noticeable. Publi-
cation of news about the placards in the press apparently increased the Porte’s 
concerns about Midhat’s governorship in Syria. News of the placards ap-
peared in al-Jawaib, the Arabic newspaper published in Istanbul, reporting 
that proclamations written in high level Arabic were posted up in different 
parts of the region inciting the people against the government and asking for 
independence (istiklal).
62
 Thus, not surprisingly, within a fortnight of the ap-
pearance of the last placard in Damascus, Midhat Pasha was dismissed from 
Syria and appointed to the province of Aydın, in Western Anatolia.
63
 Years 
after Midhat’s dismissal, Abdulhamid II explained his decision as follows: 
“Upon the appearance of the placards and published declarations against the 
Sultanate and the government, complaints against the court system and the 
finance (Adliye ve Maliye), slogans like "long live vali and long live so and 
so" which implied independence of the area and complaints against the Vali 
during his governorship, […] the Vali was removed”.
64 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 Zeine, op. cit., 55.  
60 TNA, FO, 195/1306, Jago to Goschen, no. 13, Damascus, 3 August 1880.  
61 Ibid.  
62 Al-Jawaib, 28 July 1880, 3.  
63 TNA, FO 19571306 Dickson to Goschen, no. 53, Beirut 13 August 1880; Jago to Goschen, no. 14, 
Damascus 16 August 1880.
 
64 BOA, YEE, 4/29, n.d. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
114 Ş . T U F A N B U Z P I N A R 
 
V 
 
Midhat’s removal from Syria, however, did not end the discontent 
manifested in the form of placards since 1878. In the last week of December 
1880, new anti-Ottoman placards appeared first on the streets of Sidon, and 
then on 31 December, in Beirut and Tripoli. “At Sidon a little apprehension, 
especially among the Christians, was created and a few persons, supposed to 
be implicated, have been arrested by the authorities”. However, in Beirut “no 
effect whatever has been produced and these placards are looked upon as the 
result of the discontent with the existing government that prevails amongst a 
small minority”. Dickson, the British Acting-Consul general in Beirut, con-
cluded his report by saying that “beyond the appearance of these revolution-
ary placards there is nothing, that I am aware of, which evinces any tendency 
to disturb public tranquillity”.
65 
 
Dickson enclosed a copy of the placard that appeared in Beirut on 31 
December 1880 in his despatch of 14 January 1881. The placard had two 
drawn swords pointing downwards at the top (the previous ones had one hori-
zontal drawn sword) and, unlike the previous ones, did not address the Syri-
ans.
66
 After an initial anti-Turkish rhetoric and a reference to glorious Arab 
past and pride, it included some points that were not found in the previous 
placards: Firstly, it implicitly criticised the article 18 of the 1876 Ottoman 
Constitution, which declared Turkish as the official language of the state, as a 
regulation aimed to destroy Arabic. Secondly, for the first time, it accused the 
Turks of stealing the caliphate from the Arabs. Thirdly, the Turks were 
blamed for sending Arab soldiers to battlefields outside the Arab populated 
regions. Finally, it concluded with three clear demands: Autonomy (with an 
explicit reference to Lebanon), the recognition of Arabic as official language 
and the employment of Arab soldiers in their territories.
67 
 
This placard has some novel issues: Firstly, unlike the previous ones, it 
did not address the Syrians; rather it started with an ambiguous title “O people 
of the fatherland”. As mentioned earlier, the term “fatherland” had no single 
and clear meaning in the minds of the Arabs in the region. Secondly, for the 
first time, the Turks are explicitly accused of stealing the caliphate from the 
Arabs. As recent literature demonstrates, the issue of the caliphate became the 
subject of debate in the last years of the 1870s in Britain as well as within the 
Ottoman Empire itself.
68
 Finally, it had clear demands from the Ottoman 
  
65 TNA, FO, 195/1368, Dickson to St. John, no. 1, Beirut 3 January 1881.  
66 Fort the reproduced version of the original placard see, Zeine, The Emergence…, 154  
67 For the full translation of the placard in English see, Tibawi, Arabic…, 118-119; in French see, TNA, 
FO, 195/1368, Dickson to St. John, no. 2, Beirut, 14 January 1881.
 
68 Ş. Tufan Buzpınar, “Opposition to the Ottoman Caliphate in the Early Years of Abdulhamid  
II: 1877-1882”, Die Welt des Islams, XXXVI/1 (1996), 59-89. For Abdulhamid’s suspicion that 
Britain wished to promote Arab independence that would lead to a rival Arab Caliph, see 
Yasamee, Ottoman Diplomacy, 26-27. 
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government such as autonomous administration and Arabic as official lan-
guage. All these demands had to wait until the 1910s to be clearly and openly 
pronounced by the Arabist intellectuals.
69 
 
As for the authors of the placards, in the absence of any solid evidence, 
Dickson conveyed all the current speculations about the new placards. In his 
first report on the subject, he stated that, “these placards are looked upon as 
the result of the discontent with the existing government that prevails amongst 
a small minority”.
70
 However, in the second, he underlined the fact that the 
placards appeared in Beirut and Tripoli on the same day, 31 December, 
“would indicate that they are not the production of two or three disaffected 
individuals, as many supposed, but a secret society having branches in differ-
ent parts of the country”. Moreover, he was informed that a Christian of Sidon 
wrote to Hamdi Pasha, the new governor of Syria, and accused the “Society 
of Good Intentions” of organizing the revolutionary placards.
71
 This com-
plaint was not surprising in view of the fact that the Christians of Sidon were 
disturbed by the establishment of the society of good intentions in the city.
72
 
In his last report, Dickson increasingly came under the influence of the pre-
vailing view “amongst the most persons” that the placards were the works of 
the Society of Good Intentions. Although the Society had been founded in 
1878 before Midhat Pasha was appointed to Syria he had good relations with 
members of the society during his governorship. That is why some people 
believed that Midhat was in communication with members of these societies 
even after his dismissal from Syria. Hence, some circles in Beirut thought that 
at Midhat Pasha’s “instigation, through his secret agents, the placards in ques-
tion have appeared in Syria. I am, however, unable to verify these accusations 
against him”.
73 
 
A close examination of the benevolent societies does not validate this 
suggestion. Nor does there appear to be any firm ground for the suggestion 
that Midhat Pasha had employed certain benevolent societies with which he 
had good relations, and in particular, the "Society of Good Intentions" of Si- 
 
 
69 Zeine, op.cit., 88-90; Hasan Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and 
Is-lamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918, Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1997, 91-94 and 128-129.
 
70 TNA, FO, 195/1368, Dickson-St. John, no. 1, Beirut 3 January 1881.  
71 TNA, FO, 195/1368, Dickson to St.John, no. 2, Beirut, 14 January 1881.  
72 It is worth noting that Dickson reported on 17 November “the feeling at Sidon especially 
among the Christians is one of distrust and uneasiness which arises principally from the suspi-
cious nature of the ‘society of good intentions’ established there. […] Its ostensible purpose was 
to promote education and knowledge amongst the Muslims alone”. TNA, FO 195/1306, Dickson 
to Goschen, no. 61 Beirut 17 November 1880. For more on the Christian attitude toward the 
society in Sidon see, TNA, FO, 78/3130, Ardern Beaman to Dickson, 6 November 1880, ‘Report 
on the country between Beyrout, Sidon, and Damascus’.
 
73 TNA, FO, 195/1368, Dickson to St.John, Beirut, 17 January 1881. 
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don, to organise the placard campaign.
74
 The benevolent societies in Syria 
were deliberately non-political, focused on the education of Muslim children 
and "the members of the benevolent societies included men of some standing 
in their local communities". Such men were not to be easily manipulated by 
Midhat, for "they were not dependent on Midhat for their position"; rather it 
was Midhat who needed their support in view of his shaky relations with the 
Porte. Moreover, Midhat’s successor, Ahmed Hamdi Pasha, had cordial rela-
tions with benevolent societies in the region, which leaves no room for sub-
versive activities.
75
 As for the argument circulating during the appearance of 
the placards in June 1880 that Midhat Pasha was suspiciously slow to respond 
to the placards, and that his apparent indifference to them amounted to tacit 
encouragement
76
, it must be born in mind that the first placards appeared in 
June in Beirut, when the city's governor Raif Efendi was absent, and these 
placards were posted close to the foreign consulates- in some cases, on their 
doors. These facts alone might explain the authorities' slow initial response.
77 
 
Be that as it may, the provincial authorities acted on a rather different 
information and arrested three Christians in Damascus on charge of being 
connected with the latest placard. One of them was a certain Shakir al- Khuri, 
who belonged to the Protestant community in Damascus.
78
 He knew English 
well enough to offer private lessons as well as to teach at the British mission-
ary schools. Representatives of the Protestant missionaries in the region re-
quested the British vice-consul to communicate with the Ottoman authorities 
to secure Shakir’s release. The vice-consul admits that the intelligence he had 
gathered led him to believe that Shakir “behaved extremely foolishly in the 
matter”. Nevertheless, he had contacted the provincial authorities who stated 
that “they had strong proofs against him”. Still, the vice-consul was con-
vinced that Shakir would be “detained for a short time as an example and then 
liberated”.
79 
 
Not surprisingly, the local missionaries were not satisfied with this an-
swer and tried to put pressure on the vali, Ahmed Hamdi Pasha, to release 
Shakir. Shakir himself wrote letters of appeals to several individuals and tried 
to “stir up opinion against the Governor General”. The vice-consul Jago was 
 
 
74 For the establishment of the society and its impact on the local Christians see, TNA, FO 
78/3130 Report on Beirut, Damascus and Sidon by Ardern Beaman, the British Acting Vice-
Consul at Beirut, Beirut, 17 November 1880; TNA, FO, 195/1306, Dickson to Goschen, no. 61, 
Beirut, 17 November 1880.
  
75 Donald Cioeta, "Islamic Benevolent Societies and Public Education in Ottoman Syria, 1875-1882" 
Islamic Quarterly, 26/1 (1982), 52-53.
  
76 TNA, FO, 195/1306, Dickson to Goschen, no. 47, Beirut, 3 July 1880.  
77 Zeine, op.cit., 62; FO, 195/1369, Jago to Goschen, no. 12, Damascus, 4 June 1881; BOA, YEE, 79/87.  
78 British documents reveal only one name, Shakir al-Khuri, whereas Ottoman documents reveal all 
three names as Shakir al-Khuri, Yusuf al-Haj and Georgi Meese. Shakir and Yusuf were members of 
the Protestant community in Damascus.
  
79 Memorandum on Shakir al-Houri, in Jago to Goschen, no. 12, Damascus, 4 June 1881. 
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informed that in reply to the missionaries the vali gathered information on the 
matter, which strengthened the case against Shakir. Thus, the vali asked the 
missionaries to stop agitation in favour of Shakir, if not, “it would be worse 
for the accused”. Jago described the position of the missionaries in the follow-
ing words: “with my representations to them of the impolicy of their conduct, 
ignorant as they necessarily were of the nature of the exact proofs held by the 
authorities, resulted in their ceasing their action”. Jago’s final note was also 
interesting to show the complex nature of the developments on the matter: 
“The zeal of the Mr. Houri’s advocates was much stimulated by the state-
ments made by the Christian members of the court that there was no case 
against him, but that his acquittal was resisted by pressure from the higher 
authorities”.
80 
 
It appears that one of the arrested suspects, Georgi, was released early 
in 1881 and the trial of the remaining two, namely Shakir and Yusuf, contin-
ued until the summer, when the local court decided to acquit them by a major-
ity of three out of five members. The vali, however, informed the British vice-
consul that because of the gravity of the charges against the suspects and in 
accordance with the views of the prosecutor general and the president of the 
court, he had decided to transfer the case to the Ministry of Justice in Istanbul 
for final decision. Moreover, the Ministry of Justice ordered an enquiry into 
the cause of Shakir’s detention and requested information on the subject.
81
 
Meanwhile, the vali’s cautious attitude was justified by a letter privately sent 
to the Palace trying to prevent the release of the suspects. The anonymous 
letter, written by someone who apparently occupied a high position in the 
provincial administration, informed the Sultan that “verse and prose of the 
placards belong to Shakir and handwriting to Yusuf”. It further claimed that 
the constant demands for the release of the suspects by the Protestant mis-
sionaries and some members of the British consulate in Damascus indicate the 
people who were behind this agitation.
82
 Interesting enough, the Foreign Of-
fice in London ordered the British ambassador to Istanbul to bring “crisis 
eventually to notice of the Porte and ask for his [Shakir] liberation on bail”.
83
 
What took place at the Ministry of Justice is yet to be discovered, but what is 
clear is that Shakir’s companion was released early in October and Shakir 
himself was released on 8 November 1881.
84 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
80 Ibid.  
81 TNA, FO, 195/1369, Jago to Goschen, no. 2, Damascus 18 October 1881.  
82 BOA, YEE, 79/87.  
83 TNA, FO, 195/1369, Jago to Goschen, no. 2, Damascus 18 October 1881.  
84 TNA, FO, 195/1369, telegram from Jago, Damascus, 9 November 1881. 
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VI 
 
The last placard
85
 under review, dated 9/19 March 1881 (7/17 Rabi‘al-Thani 
1298)
86
, has some special features. It was the only printed one in a flysheet 
form and the longest one with the best page setting. It was distributed by the 
foreign postal services to the European consuls serving in the Arab populated 
cities and it appears that the Arab subjects of the state could not become 
aware of it. It should also be underlined that it was the only placard that 
reached the Ottoman authorities in the region, probably on purpose, and they 
in turn made an exact translation of it into Turkish and submitted it to the Pal-
ace.
87
 It was widely distributed by post from Khartoum in the Sudan to Alge-
ria in North Africa, from Alexandria in Egypt to Baghdad in Iraq. In his letter 
of 27 July 1881 addressed to the Palace, Safvet Pasha, the governor of the 
Hijaz, mentioned the arrival of a package of printed anti- Ottoman placards in 
the Hijaz and stated that one of them was even addressed the Amir of Mecca, 
Abdulmuttalib Pasha, with whom he was not on good terms.
88
 It appears that 
the placard reached different destinations in different times depending on the 
nature of the postal network of the time, thus, reports by foreign consuls and 
Ottoman officials on the subject dated between April and July 1881.
89 
 
As for its printing location, the quality of the printing led to a general 
conviction that it had been printed outside the Ottoman Empire. In this con-
nection, an interesting deduction came from Plowden, the British consul gen-
eral in Baghdad, who provided the only copy available in the National Ar-
chives. Plowden confiscated three copies of al-Ghairat
90
, an Arabic and Per-
sian newspaper published in London, and comparing the type of the Arabic 
letters used in al-Ghairat and the placard, he reached the conclusion that both 
had been printed in the same printing house in London.
91
 Dobignie, the 
French consul at Alexandria, however, assumed that it was printed either in  
 
85 Original copies of the placard are available in British and French archives. Landau published it in 
Arabic and English. See, Landau, “An Arab Anti-Turk Handbill, 1881”, 322-327. Fort the English 
translation of the British consulate in Baghdad see, TNA, FO 195/1370, Plowden to Granville, 
confidential no. 21, Baghdad, 20 May 1881.
  
86 The Ottoman translation of the placard bears the date 9 March 1881 whereas the copies avail-able 
in the British and the French archives are dated 19 March 1881.
  
87 BOA, YEE, 44/145.  
88 BOA, YEE, 44/145, 29 Şaban 1298/ 27 July 1881.  
89 From the French consuls in the region, the earliest report dates Alexandria, 23 April 1881 and the 
latest from Khartum 28 June 1881. See Landau, “An Arab Anti-Turk Handbill, 1881”, 215, fn. 2 &3; 
The only report in the National Archives in London is dated 20 May 1881. See, TNA, FO, 195/1370, 
Plowden to Granville, no. 21, Baghdad 20 May 1881. BOA, YEE, 18/94-26/94/44,
  
29 Şaban 1298/27 July 1881.  
90 Al-Ghairat was a pro-Ottoman bilingual newspaper published in London by a certain Indian 
Abdul Rasul who apparently received financial support from the Ottoman Embassy in London. See, 
Azmi Özcan, Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain, 1877-1924, Leiden: 
Brill, 1997, 120-121.
  
91 TNA, FO, 195/1370, Plowden to Granville, confidential no. 21, Baghdad, 20 May 1881. 
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France or in Italy. He also held that “contents and the style” of the placard 
indicated that an educated European was its author.
92
 Judging from the lan-
guage structure, frequent grammatical mistakes and foreign concepts and ide-
as in the placard, Arabic language and literature experts supported Dobignie’s 
view that the author could have been an educated European. Moreover, all 
these internal evidences evoke a possibility that the original text could have 
been written in a European language and then was translated into Arabic.
93
 
Ironically, despite the obvious contrary evidence, Landau asserts that “the 
author (or group of authors) was probably Muslim, well-versed in Arabic”.
94 
 
Regarding the contents of the placard, it started with a new and unfa-
miliar concept of the Arab nation (al-umma al-arabiyya), a concept which 
would have to wait for decades to take ground in the Arab populated regions. It 
was followed by desperate efforts to address the Muslims and to agitate them 
against the Turks.
95
 The anti-Turkish agitation tone was here the highest of all 
the placards since July 1878. However, the content of the text did not support the 
main goal, since the emphasis was on the Christians who revolted against the 
Ottoman Empire and examples were chosen from the Christian countries in the 
Balkans who expelled thousands of Muslims, some of whom had to settle in the 
Arab provinces, particularly in Syria.
96
 The second para-graph also had a 
contradictory character for it emphasized the Arab sacrifices during the Russo-
Ottoman War of 1877-78, but in reality, only the Muslim Arabs participated in 
the war which became a source of resentment on the part of the Muslims against 
the Christians. Likewise, an effort to address the Arabs as a nation did not 
correspond to any clear meaning in the minds of the major-ity of the Arabs, 
Muslim or Christian even in cities like Beirut.
97
 The text itself in paragraph six 
encouraged the Christians to end disunity among them-  
 
92 Landau, op.cit., 218-219. Dobignie’s view is not out of question in view of the fact that during the 
period under study, there were some European figures who were eager to end the Ottoman rule in 
Arab provinces. One such figure was Wilfrid S. Blunt (1840-1922) who worked hard between 1879 
and 1881 to organize an Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire. He even collect-ed some rifles, 
revolvers, and cannon to distribute to the Arabs in order to use against the Otto-mans. See, Elizabeth 
Longford, A Pilgrimage of Passion: The Life of Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, Lon-don 1979, 200. For 
more on Blunt’s anti-Turkish activities in Arabia see Tufan Buzpınar, “Oppo-sition to the Ottoman 
Caliphate in the Early Years of Abdülhamid II: 1877-1882”, Die Welt des Islams, 36/1 (March 
1996), 80-88.
  
93 I wish to express my gratitude to Özgür Kavak and Abdul Rahman Harash, Arabic language and 
literature experts at Istanbul Şehir University, for sharing their views and analysis on its contents and 
language structure. During my studies for a Turkish version of this article, the late Ibrahim Dakuki, an 
expert on Arabic language and literature and Turkish Arab relations had expressed similar views on 
the placard’s language structure and style. I remember him with great respect and appreciation.
 
 
94 Landau, op.cit., 218.  
95 Four out of seven addresses were “O you Muslims!”.  
96 For the Muslim Arab feelings after the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78 see, Buzpınar, Ab-
dulhamid II and the Arabs: The Cases of Syria and the Hijaz, 1878-1882, University of Manches-
ter, unpublished PhD thesis, 1991, 131-132.
 
97 Zeine, op.cit., 52; Groiss, op.cit., 30-54. 
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selves and to unite with the Muslims against the Turks. The underlining fea-
ture of the whole text was its repetitive agitation to make the Arabs revolt 
against the Turks.
98
 For the first time, the Turks were accused of selling Arab 
territories to Russians, Serbs and Bulgarians and if they had another chance, 
they would sell more territories to the Greeks. Interestingly, the idea that the 
Turks would sell some parts of the country was common in the minds of some 
contemporary British politicians and businessmen after the Russo Ottoman 
War of 1877-78.
99 
 
As for the reactions shown by the local dignitaries, the provincial au-
thorities and the Porte, the available literature based on the European diplo-
matic correspondence converged on the view that there was no serious local 
reaction against the placards that appeared in different cities between 1878 
and 1881. However, the Ottoman documents and newspapers of the period do 
not support this view; on the contrary, they prove that there was a strong local 
reaction in Beirut and Damascus. Al-Jawaib, the Arabic newspaper published 
in Istanbul, reported news of reactions from local newspapers such as 
Suriyya, al-Asr al-Jadid and al-Misbah. Al-Jawaib reported that al-
Misbah of Beirut viewed the placards as works of “ignorant and careless 
people who wished the people revolt against the government”. Al-Misbah 
urged the government to take necessary measures to prevent the recurrence of 
such seditious acts.
100
 According to al-Asr al-Jadid, the local authorities did 
not take the placards seriously thinking that it was the work of a foreigner 
(rajul afranj), but these placards were products of insane and inauspicious 
people who should be pun-ished by law.
101
 The “rich and influential 
inhabitants”
102
 of Beirut displayed the strongest reaction against the last 
placard of December 1880. Although they did not see the placards themselves, 
but heard about their appearance in Beirut, they condemned the perpetrators 
and emphasized that they were al-ways with the state, observed full obedience 
and would not accept anything that would undermine their loyalty to the state. 
They also emphasized their loyalty to the Sultan who held “the Great 
Caliphate” (Al-Khilafa al-A‘zam).
103 
 
Moreover, on behalf of the people of Syria (Suriye ahalisi) the digni-
taries of Beirut and Damascus visited Ahmed Hamdi Pasha, the governor, in 
several groups to express their sadness for the news in foreign newspapers on 
 
 
98 The degree of anti-Turkish agitation can be deduced from the fact that the term “Turk” is used for 
fifteen times in a negative sense whereas the term “Arab” is used three times in a positive sense.
 
99 People like Laurence Oliphant worked hard after the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78 to per-suade 
the Ottoman authorities to sell some territories in Palestine but all their efforts proved fu-tile. See, 
Anne Taylor, Laurence Oliphant, 1829-1888, Oxford 1982, 190-214.
  
100 “Ahwal al-Suriyya”, in Al-Jawaib, 28 July 1880, 3.  
101 Quoted in Al-Jawaib, 18 August 1880, 2.  
102 TNA, FO, 195/1368, Dickson to St. John, no. 2, Beirut, 14 January 1881.  
103 Al-Jawaib, 31 December 1880/27 Muharram 1298. 
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the appearance of anti-government placards and conveyed their thanks for the 
government services. Hamdi Pasha seemed convinced of the sincerity of the 
dignitaries and the loyalty of the Arabs to the state and the “Great Caliphate” 
and blamed outsiders who were trying, through some secret agents, to agitate 
and incite the Arabs against the government.
104
 In addition, the dignitaries of 
Beirut, Damascus, Hama and Nablus sent petitions to the Porte expressing 
their loyalty and obedience to the Caliphate and the Ottoman state. Although 
Hama and Nablus petitions are not yet discovered, the ones in Beirut and Da-
mascus demonstrate the determination of the dignitaries to react strongly 
against the anti-Ottoman efforts in the region. Thirty-seven (twenty -three of 
them were sealed) dignitaries of Beirut and one hundred (ninety-nine of them 
were sealed) dignitaries of Damascus came together and signed separate peti-
tions, expressing their loyalty and support to the caliphate and the govern-
ment. Dickson reported the Beirut initiative in the following words: “An ad-
dress has been forwarded to the Vali, signed by most of the rich and influen-
tial inhabitants of Beyrout, expressing their loyalty to the Sultan and deprecat-
ing any wish to sympathize with a revolutionary movement”.
105
 The Beirut 
petition, by strange coincidence, bore the date of the third placard available in 
original, i.e., 31 December 1880. It was written on a letterhead paper with a 
symbol of the formula Bismillāh al-Rahmān al-Rahīm (basmalah) at the 
top and the format was in line with the Ottoman orthography. It began by an 
ex-pression of sadness to see news in foreign newspapers about the anti-
government placards that appeared in the country (baldah) and continued by 
emphasizing their feelings of “utmost loyalty and complete obedience” to the 
state (al-sadāqat al-tāmmah wa al-tā‘at al-mutlaqah).
106
 The Damascus 
peti-tion, dated 11 January 1881, was written on a plain paper and started with 
the formula Bismillāh al-Rahmān al-Rahīm followed by a traditional 
Islamic prayer with a language of the ‘ulamā’ class. The content, however, 
was simi-lar to the Beirut petition in the sense that they learned sad news from 
foreign newspapers regarding the anti-government placards appeared on the 
streets of Damascus which aimed to insert mistrust between the people of the 
region and the state. They emphasized that they are “satisfied with the 
sublime state” and are aware of the fact that the state protects their lives, 
honour and proper-ties.
107 
 
The Ottoman authorities in the province and the centre were pleased to 
see the local dignitaries’ strong reaction against the anti-Ottoman placards. In 
his letter to the Porte on the subject, Hamdi Pasha emphasized that the people 
of Syria had made and continued to make great contributions to the state, and 
because of their religious understandings, they considered it necessary to obey 
 
 
104 BOA, Y.A. Res., 9/64, Hamdi Pasha to the Porte, 13 Safer 1298/15 January 1881.  
105 TNA, FO, 195/1368, Dickson to St. John, no. 2, Beirut, 14 January 1881.  
106 BOA, Y.A. Res., 9/64 enclosure 3, 27 Muharrem 1298 (19/31 Kanun-ı evvel 1296).  
107 BOA, Y.A. Res., 9/64 enclosure 1, 11 Safer 1298. Forty-seven seals out of ninety-nine on the petition 
belong to the members of ulema class.
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orders coming from the Caliph. Although the placards would not have any 
negative effect on their loyalty to the state, they, however, wished to prevent 
any possibility of discrediting the people of Syria in the eyes of the govern-
ment and the caliph. It was mainly for this reason that the “distinguished and 
esteemed” (mu‘tabaran wa mutahayyizan) people of Beirut and Damascus 
presented petitions to the governor and asked him to submit them to the Porte 
and the Palace.
108
 In addition, Hamdi Pasha held that the people of Syria, 
during the Russo Ottoman War of 1877-78 and after, did excellent service to 
the state and deserved to be rewarded by the state with various orders and 
decorations. To ease the work of the central government, he prepared a list of 
114 distinguished people from the region and proposed an order or decoration 
that would be appropriate for them. In the list, there were many members of 
the well-known families in the region such as Attarzade, Azmzade, Hamzaza-
de, Ajlanizade, Mardam Bekzade and Kaylanizade.
109 
 
The Council of Ministers discussed the issue of placards and the reac-
tion of the people of Syria. They also examined the list of leading people sent 
by Hamdi Pasha. They were impressed by the support displayed by the Syrian 
dignitaries and proposed to the Sultan that such a strong display of loyalty 
deserved special thanks. The Council also proposed that the letters of loyalty 
sent by the Syrian dignitaries to be announced through the press and found 
Hamdi Pasha’s suggestion of the distribution of orders and decorations ac-
ceptable.
110
 Meanwhile, the Porte and the Palace displayed how delighted 
they were to receive loyalty letters from Beirut, Damascus, Hama and Nablus. 
These letters of “loyalty and obedience” were announced in the press as the 
authors wished to see it. In addition, Hamdi Pasha was informed about all 
these developments and asked to convey the message to the people of Syria 
that the government had been pleased to see their constructive attitude.
111
 As 
for the rewards of orders and decorations for the people listed by Hamdi Pa-
sha, the Palace decided to postpone one third of the list and approved the 
rest.
112 
 
VII 
 
In conclusion, this article is the only study that examines all the copies and 
translations of the placards that appeared in the Syrian region between 1878 
and 1881. The heavy defeat of the Ottomans at the 1877-78 Russo-Ottoman 
 
 
108 BOA, Y.A. Res., 9/64, Hamdi Pasha to the Porte, 13 Safer 1298/15 January 1881.  
109 BOA, Y.A. Res., 9/64, Hamdi Pasha to the Porte, 13 Safer 1298. For the influential families in 
Damascus politics, Linda Schatkowski Schilcher, Families in Politics: Damascene Factions and 
Estates of the 18th and 19th Centuries, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1985, 110-218.
  
110 BOA, Y.A. Res., 9/64, Said Pasha to the Palace, 25 Safer 1298/27 January 1881.  
111 The Porte’s letter of 8 Rebiulahir 1298/10 March 1881 to the governor of Syria is reproduced in the 
Tercüman-ı Hakikat, no. 857, 3 May 1881, 2.
  
112 BOA, Yıldız Resmi Maruzat Defterleri, no. 21, 9 Receb 1298/26 May 1881. 
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War led to serious questions especially in Syria and Lebanon as to the future 
of the Ottoman state. In this context, its negative impact on the Muslims in 
Syria was especially noticeable during and immediately after the war and dis-
played itself in the form of a series of meetings. However, it did not last long. 
On the other hand, the negative impact of the war on some circles among the 
Christians in the region lasted a bit longer. It appears that the war created a 
slim hope in the minds of some young Arabs to end the Ottoman rule in the 
Arab provinces in general and in Syria and Lebanon in particular. All indica-
tions of the period under study suggest that these young Arabs were mostly 
educated at the missionary schools or had connections with the missionaries 
in the region. The available evidence suggest that the Muslim Arabs did not 
play a role in the placard affairs. Ottoman documents regarding the Damas-
cus placards and Faris Nimr’s interviews with Antonious and Zeine also sup-
port this view. In this context, there are clear references to the war and its 
burden on the region in some placards. The clearest and most significant one 
to the war is in the printed placard of March 1881. 
 
All the placards taken together, it is possible to identify some of their 
common aspects. Firstly, the authors tried to make sure that copies of the 
placards should reach British and French consuls in the region. This would 
suggest that they primarily aimed to influence the two major imperial powers’ 
views on the future of the Ottoman state. In other words, their primary audi-
ence was not the Arabs living in major cities like Beirut and Damascus. This 
may help to explain why not many Arabs were aware of the appearance of the 
placards until the placard news were published in European newspapers. It 
also explains why there was not a strong reaction in the region until the local 
dignitaries learned the news of the placards in foreign press. Several refer-
ences in the placards to Western concepts such as “Arab nation”, “Turkish 
state” and “fatherland” that did not correspond to any clear meaning in the 
minds of local Arabs also suggest that the primary audience in the minds of 
the authors were not local Arabs. Secondly, the authors used the language of 
an outsider, positioned themselves as friends, who advised the Syrians to end 
the Ottoman rule in the region. Apart from the last and the printed placard, all 
the others addressed Syria, the fatherland and the Syrians. Part of this advice 
was consistent with the anti-Turkish agitation in all the placards, asking the 
people of the region to awake, i.e., to revolt against Ottoman rule. Thirdly, the 
placards reiterated the need to reform and the lack of hope that the Turks 
would carry out the desired reforms. Finally, the texts of the handwritten 
placards suggest that authors were native, modern educated and secular mind-
ed people, who had strong feelings toward reforms and decentralization. The 
last and the only printed placard, however, has a very different place among 
all others: it has many grammatical mistakes, inconsistencies among para-
graphs (cf. 1st and 4th) and usage of some concepts and phrases which were 
not used in Arabic of the period such as “Turkish state” and “Arab nation”. It 
is also the only one that addressed the Arabs in general irrespective of reli- 
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gious and regional differences whereas the others addressed Syria or the Syri-
ans. 
 
Finally, what brought the end of anti-Ottoman agitation in Syria? It 
seems that a number of factors worked in favour of the Ottoman state in the 
region. Firstly, by the end of 1881, the Ottoman state managed to give strong 
signals that it was recovering from the heavy damage of the Russo-Ottoman 
war of 1877-78. Unlike the intensive discussions about the future of the state 
in 1878, the local dignitaries showed that they had strong confidence in the 
Ottoman state by coming together and signing petitions to denounce the anti-
Ottoman agitation. The strong pro-Ottoman attitude of the local dignitaries 
was an important setback for the anti-Ottoman elements in the region. As time 
progressed, the Syrians’ confidence in the state became noticeable even by 
foreign observers, who were closely monitoring developments in the region. 
One such observer was Wilfred S. Blunt, who had worked hard to alienate the 
Arabs from the Turks since 1878. However, by 1881, it became clear to Blunt 
that Sultan Abdulhamid gradually consolidated his power in Arab populated 
provinces and the Muslim Arabs generally accepted him as the Caliph.
113 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
113 Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, The Future of Islam, London 1882, reprinted by Sind Sagar Academy, 
Lahore 1975, viii-ix; 91-93.
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A petition in Arabic signed by thirty seven dignitaries of Beirut to express their loyal-
ty and obedience to the Caliphate and the State. BOA, Y.A. Res. 9/64 27 Muharrem 
1298/31 December 1880. 
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A petition in Arabic signed by one hundred dignitaries of Damascus to 
express their loyalty and obedience to the Caliphate and the State. BOA, Y.A. 
Res. 9/64 11 Safer 1298/13 January 1881. 
